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tandfonline.com – Merit pay, case-by-case: Variables affecting student achievement, teacher retention, and the problem of standardized tests

tandfonline.com har udgivet en rapport under søgningen “Teacher Education Mathematics”: Abstract Abstract This study encompasses the history, definition, and implementation of merit pay to identify the variables that affect student achievement and teacher retention. By reviewing 13 studies on American education relevant to the policy, this study aims to determine how merit pay influenced student achievement and teacher retention rates. In the United States of America (USA), merit pay effectively improves student achievement and teacher retention rates under certain circumstances. However, this policy could also be ineffectual. An analysis of a review of 13 studies identified the variables that affected student achievement and teacher retention. These include year, location, policy duration, merit pay type, students’ grade level, and participating teachers’ ethnicities. The conclusions drawn from this study suggest implementing an… Continue Reading

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Eric.ed.gov – Do School Districts Get What They Pay for? Predicting Teacher Effectiveness by College Selectivity, Experience, Etc. Program on Education Policy and Governance Working Papers Series. PEPG 10-08

eric.ed.gov har udgivet: Holding a college major in education is not correlated with effectiveness in elementary and middle school classrooms, regardless of the university at which the major was earned. Teachers do become more effective with a few years of teaching experience, but (except in elementary reading) no gains–and some declines–in effectiveness appear in the second decade after a teacher has begun teaching. These and other results are obtained from estimations using value-added models that control for student characteristics as well as school and (where appropriate teacher) fixed effects that estimate teacher effectiveness in reading and math for Florida students in 4th through 8th grades for six school years, 2001-02 through 2006-07. The findings suggest that teacher selection and compensation policies are in need of revision. (Contains 2 figures, 11… Continue Reading

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Eric.ed.gov – Review of “Cross-Country Evidence on Teacher Performance Pay”

eric.ed.gov har udgivet: The primary claim of this Harvard Program on Education Policy and Governance report and the abridged Education Next version is that nations “that pay teachers on their performance score higher on PISA tests.” After statistically controlling for several variables, the author concludes that nations with some form of merit pay system have, on average, higher reading and math scores on this international test of 15-year-old students. Although the author lists numerous caveats, his broad conclusions do not heed these cautions. The fundamental differences among countries in the types of performance pay system are not properly considered. Nations are simply lumped together as having or not having a performance pay plan. Also, the length of time the program had been in place in each country is not addressed… Continue Reading

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Eric.ed.gov – Long-Term Effects of Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India

eric.ed.gov har udgivet: While the idea of teacher performance-pay is increasingly making its way into policy, the evidence on the effectiveness of such programs is both limited and mixed. The central questions in the literature on teacher performance pay to date have been whether teacher performance pay based on test scores can improve student achievement, and whether there are negative consequences of teacher incentives based on student test scores? The literature on both of these questions highlight the importance of not just evaluating teacher incentive programs that are designed by administrators, but of using economic theory to design systems of teacher performance pay that are likely to induce higher effort from teachers towards improving human capital and less likely to be susceptible to gaming. Also, while there is a growing… Continue Reading

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Eric.ed.gov – Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the NYC Bonus Program. Program on Education Policy and Governance Working Papers Series. PEPG 10-07

eric.ed.gov har udgivet: Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the NYC Bonus Program. Program on Education Policy and Governance Working Papers Series. PEPG 10-07 Link til kilde

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Eric.ed.gov – Cross-Country Evidence on Teacher Performance Pay. Program on Education Policy and Governance Working Papers Series. PEPG 10-11

eric.ed.gov har udgivet: The general-equilibrium effects of performance-related teacher pay include long-term incentive and teacher-sorting mechanisms that usually elude experimental studies but are captured in cross-country comparisons. Combining country-level performance-pay measures with rich PISA-2003 international achievement microdata, this paper estimates student-level international education production functions. The use of teacher salary adjustments for outstanding performance is significantly associated with math, science, and reading achievement across countries. Scores in countries with performance-related pay are about one quarter standard deviations higher. Results avoid bias from within-country selection and are robust to continental fixed effects and to controlling for non-performance-based forms of teacher salary adjustments. (Contains 7 tables, and 1 figure, and 18 footnotes.) Link til kilde

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Eric.ed.gov – The Effects of Differential Pay on Teacher Recruitment and Retention. Working Paper No. 219-0519

eric.ed.gov har udgivet: Traditionally, teacher salaries have been determined solely by experience and educational attainment. This has led to chronic shortages of teachers in particular subject areas, such as math, science and special education. We study the first long-running statewide program to differentiate teacher pay based on subject area, Georgia’s bonus system for math and science teachers. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find the bonuses reduce teacher attrition by 18 to 28 percent. However, we find no evidence the program increases the probability that education majors become secondary math or science teachers upon graduation or alters specific major choices within the education field. Link til kilde